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Abstract 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) encompasses activities and strategies which enable the company to identify, measure, reduce, 
or exploit, as well as to control and monitor the exposure to various types of corporate risks – strategic, financial, operational, and 
reporting, as well as compliance risks for the purpose of increasing the organization’s value to its stakeholders. The primary goal 
of ERM is to increase the likelihood that an organization will achieve its objectives, meaning that ERM should be created and 
implemented with the aim to protect and create shareholder value. For ERM to bring benefits, as it is well-explained in the existing 
ERM literature (e.g. see Beasley et al., 2005; Cumming and Hirtle, 2001; Lam, 2001, 2003; Liebenberg et and Hoyt, 2003; 
Meulbroek, 2002; Nocco and Stulz 2006), it should be integrated in the most important business processes, such as strategic 
management, strategic planning, as well as in the finance and investment decisions in order to ensure the consistent evaluation and 
management of risks that arise from business initiatives and plans. This paper is both conceptual and empirical. It is aiming to (1) 
develop ERM Index that measures quality of ERM process within the company, (2) to explore level of ERM development in listed 
Croatian companies by employing ERM Index (3) to explore determinants of risk management system development in listed 
Croatian companies (4) to explore whether risk management decisions have different rationales in Croatian companies than among 
their western counterparts. Different theories of risk management derived from capital market imperfections are used to argue for 
the relevance of corporate risk management function. Empirical research was conducted on the listed Croatian non-financial 
companies. Data were collected from two sources; annual reports and notes to the financial statements and survey. Research results 
have revealed low levels of ERM development in listed Croatian companies. Managers are focused on financial and operative risk 
management, while strategic and other risks have been neglected. Regression analysis has indicated somewhat unexpected but 
important conclusion - the explored risk management rationales have weak predictive power in explaining corporate risk 
management decisions in Croatian companies. The level or risk management system development is dependent only on the size of 
the company and value of the growth options. 
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1. Introduction 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is an important element of an effective corporate governance system. It is 
defined as a combination of activities and strategies that results in reduction of a negative impact of various types of 
risks - financial, operational and strategic - to the planned business results and value created to shareholders and other 
company’s stakeholders. According to Casualty Actuarial Society (2003) Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is the 
discipline, by which an organization in an industry assesses, controls, exploits, finances, and monitors risks from all 
sources for the purpose of increasing the organization’s short and long-term value to its stakeholders. This novel and 
holistic approach to corporate risk management, entitled Integrated Risk Management, Strategic Risk Management, 
Enterprise Risk Management or just ERM, includes an assessment of the total exposure to all identified risks that 
directly or indirectly affect the value of the company as well as the implementation of a risk management strategy that 
is complementary to the business strategy of a corporation. ERM has been applied in financial institutions and 
corporations since the beginning of 21st century, and the number of users has increased significantly in recent years.  
 
Effective risk management is considered to be a leading competitive advantage that determines the survival and 
success of the company in an uncertain global environment (Bartram, 2000). The global financial crisis has focused 
attention to the proper identification, analysis and management of key business risks because inadequate risk 
assessment has been identified as one of the main factors of a failure or financial difficulties of a large number of 
organizations worldwide. Hence, inadequate risk management has become a problem of broader social interests, 
resulting in recommendations of the OECD and the European Commission1 on the necessary changes in the existing 
risk management systems. As a result, an increasing number of companies are moving on from traditional silo-based 
risk management (TRM), where different corporate risks were managed on the individual basis without taking into 
account their correlations, toward ERM, where a holistic view of corporate risks is conducted and overall risk exposure 
is assessed (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011).  There is a belief among increasing number of scholars (e.g., see Cumming 
and Hirtle, 2001; Lam, 2001; Meulbroek, 2002; Lam, 2003; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Nocco and Stulz, 2006; 
Beasley et al., 2005) that ERM offers companies a more comprehensive approach toward risk management in 
comparison to TRM. By adopting a systematic and consistent approach to managing all of the risks confronting an 
organization, ERM is presumed to lower a firm’s overall risk of a failure and thus increase the performance and, in 
turn, the value of the organization (Gordon et al., 2009). For ERM to bring benefits, as it is well-explained in the cited 
ERM literature, it should be integrated in the most important business processes, such as strategic management, 
strategic planning, as well as in the finance and investment decisions in order to ensure the consistent evaluation and 
management of risks that arise from business initiatives and plans.  
 
This paper is both conceptual and empirical. It contributes to the existing literature in few ways. Firstly, we develop 
ERM Index that measures quality of ERM process within the company. Second, we explore level of ERM 
development in listed Croatian companies by employing ERM Index. Third, we explore determinants of risk 
management system development in listed Croatian companies, what has enabled us to study whether risk 
management decisions have different rationales in Croatian companies than among their western counterparts. 
Different theories of risk management derived from capital market imperfections are used to argue for the relevance 
of corporate risk management function. Empirical research was conducted on the listed Croatian non-financial 
companies. Data were collected from two sources; annual financial reports and survey. Research results have revealed 
low levels of ERM development in listed Croatian companies. Managers are focused on financial and operative risk 
management, while strategic and other risks have been neglected. Regression analysis has indicated somewhat 
 
 
1 Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance (2010), Corporate Governance and the 
Financial Crisis, pp. 107-118 ; European Commission (2010), Green Paper: Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration 
Policies; OECD (2009) Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages, pp-1-60 
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unexpected but important conclusion - the explored risk management rationales have weak predictive power in 
explaining corporate risk management decisions in Croatian companies. The level or risk management system 
development is dependent only on the size of the company and value of the growth options. 
2. Theorizing the framework  
Positive theories of risk management, as a lever for shareholder value creation, are subject of research for more 
than three decades. Studies cited here mostly explored the effect of hedging to the company’s value or determinants 
of hedging decision in the company. Empirical evidence on what determines the enterprise risk management 
implementation, and how ERM affects company’s performance and value is very scarce (Bromiley et al., 2014) and 
will be analysed at the end of this section. However, to understand the rationales of risk management, in general, we 
provide an extensive analysis of the research done in the past 30 years, well before ERM emerged. It should be noted 
that research that will be presented in this section is mainly focused on quantifiable risks like financial risks that can 
be hedged by using derivatives. Therefore, hedging can be seen as a mean of Traditional risk management. In TRM 
research, various value-increasing benefits were found which can be classified as reduction in expected costs related 
to financial distress, asymmetric information and agency costs, underinvestment problem, tax costs and managerial 
utility. 
 
Positive theories of risk management are related to the shareholders value maximization hypothesis, which argue 
that the firm value is a concave objective function because of capital market imperfections. The theories were born as 
an answer to the Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) “risk management irrelevance principle” created under perfect market 
conditions. The MM propositions were intended to hold only under a restrictive set of conditions, the most important 
of which are that there are no costs associated with bankruptcy or financial distress, no taxes or transactions costs, that 
corporate investment decisions are not influenced by financing choices, including decisions to hedge various price 
risks, that reliable information about the firm's future earnings prospects is costlessly available to all investors and 
managers alike, and that individuals and firms have equal access to all security markets, including the ability to issue 
identical securities on the same terms (Culp, 1994). Despite the fact that, in the basic MM world, hedging does not 
alter firm value, markets where derivatives are traded are dominated by corporations and institutions, not by 
individuals trading for their personal accounts. The positive import of the MM framework, and its main message to 
corporate practitioners, is presented by “positive risk management theories” or better called “risk management 
rationales” suggesting that hedging is a value-increasing strategy for the firm.  
 
The first risk management rationale suggests that, by reducing the volatility of cash flows, firms can decrease costs 
of financial distress (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Myers, 1984; Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Shapiro and Titman, 
1998). In the MM world, financial distress is assumed to be costless. Hence, altering the probability of financial 
distress does not affect firm value. If financial distress is costly, firms have incentives to reduce its probability, and 
hedging is one method by which a firm can reduce the volatility of its earnings. By reducing the variance of a firm’s 
cash flows or accounting profits, hedging decreases the probability, and thus the expected costs, of financial distress. 
Additionally, Smith and Stulz (1985) have argued that, while the reduction of financial distress costs increases firm 
value, it augments shareholder value even further by simultaneously raising the firm’s potential to carry debt. 
Corporate risk management lowers the cost of financial distress, which leads to a higher optimal debt ratio and the tax 
shields of the additional debt capital further increases the value of the firm. This theory has been empirically proven 
by, among others, Campbell and Kracaw (1987), Bessembinder (1991), Dolde (1995), Mian (1996) and Haushalter 
(2000).  
 
The second rationale suggests that, by reducing the volatility of cash flows, firms can decrease agency costs (see: 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to Dobson and Soenen (1993) there are three sound reasons based on agency 
costs why management should hedge corporate risk. First, hedging reduces uncertainty by smoothing the cash flow 
stream thereby lowering the firm's cost of debt. Since the agency cost is borne by management, assuming informational 
asymmetry between management and bondholders, hedging will increase the value of the firm. Therefore, manage-
ment will rationally choose to hedge. Second, given the existence of debt financing, cash flow smoothing through 
exchange risk hedging will tend to reduce the risk-shifting as well as the underinvestment problems. Finally, hedging 
reduces the probability of financial distress and thereby increases duration of contractual relations between 
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stakeholders. By fostering corporate reputation acquisition, hedging contributes directly to the amelioration of the 
moral-hazard agency problem. Results of MacMinn and Han (1990), Bessembinder (1991), Minton and Schrand 
(1999) and Haushalter et al. (2002) support this hedging rationale.  
 
The third hedging theory relates to the capital market imperfections and costly external financing. It argues that 
decreasing the expected cash flow volatility can improve the probability of having sufficient internal funds for planned 
investments eliminating the need either to cut profitable projects or bear the transaction costs of obtaining external 
funding. The main hypothesis is that, if access to external financing (debt and/or equity) is costly, firms with 
investment projects requiring funding will hedge their cash flows to avoid a shortfall in their funds, which could 
precipitate a costly visit to the capital markets (Froot et al., 1993). Another perspective related to Froot et al. (1993) 
pertains to the Myers and Majluf (1984) ''pecking order" concept of financing. Hedging, by its ability to decrease the 
variability of cash flow, enables the firm to reduce the number of states of nature where it must obtain external 
financing and thus hedging can help avoid sending a potentially negative signal to external investors. An interesting 
empirical insight based on this risk management theory is that firms which have substantial growth opportunities and 
face high costs when raising funds under financial distress will have an incentive to hedge more of their exposure than 
the average firm. This rationale has been empirically proven by numerous scholars, among others by Hoshi et al. 
(1991), Froot et al. (1993), Geczy, et al. (1997), Gay and Nam (1998), Graham and Rogers (1999), Minton and Schrand 
(1999), Haushalter (2000), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Haushalter et al. (2002) and Miloš Sprčić and Šević (2012).  
 
Nance et al. (1993) have also argued that firms can reduce the expected financial distress and agency costs 
associated with long-term debt by maintaining greater short-term liquidity, and have used current ratio and dividend 
price ratio as measures for this hypothesis. Geczy et al. (1997) have used two variables as proxies for a firm’s short-
term liquidity: the quick ratio defined as cash and short-term investment divided by current liabilities, and the dividend 
payout ratio defined as the common dividend per share divided by earnings per share (used also by Haushalter (2000)). 
They have predicted that the greater a firm’s quick ratio and the lower its dividend payout ratio, the lower its need to 
hedge to reduce the expected financial distress and agency cost of straight debt. Mian (1996) has employed year-end 
ratio of current assets to current liabilities as a measure of corporate liquidity. Haushalter (2000) has calculated the 
level of cash holding using the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the market value of total assets. Mian (1996), 
Tufano (1996) and Haushalter (2000) have predicted a negative relation between numbered measures representing 
alternative financial policy and a decision to hedge. On the other hand, Froot et al. (1993) have predicted a positive 
association between liquidity and hedging, which results from the interpretation of liquidity not as a substitute for 
hedging, but as a measure of the availability of internal funds.  
 
Other line of reasoning that differs from the shareholders’ value maximization hypothesis refers to the managerial 
utility maximization hypothesis. It has been argued that firm managers have limited ability to diversify their own 
personal wealth position, associated with stock holdings and the capitalization of their career earnings associated with 
their own employment position. Therefore, they will have an incentive to hedge their own wealth on the expense of 
the shareholders. Usually that kind of hedging is not conducted to improve value of company’s stockholders but to 
improve managers own wealth. To avoid this problem, managerial compensation contract must be designed so that 
when managers increase the value of the firm, they also increase their expected utility. This can usually be obtained 
by adding option-like provisions to managerial contracts. This rationale was firstly proposed by Stulz (1984) and has 
been further explored by Smith and Stulz (1985). Results of some empirical studies have confirmed this hypothesis 
(e.g. see: Tufano (1996) and Gay and Nam (1998) while, in contrast, Geczy et al. (1997) and Haushalter (2000) have 
not found evidence that corporate hedging is affected by managerial shareholdings.  
As it could be seen from the literature review, many authors explored effects of hedging as a risk management 
technique and found that hedging stabilizes expected earnings and cash flows reducing the probability of financial 
distress and agency cost of debt, increases the growth potential of the company and consequently increases the 
company’s value. Contrary to rich empirical evidence on the effects of hedging, only few studies explored the effect 
of ERM on the company’s performance and value. Gordon et al. (2009), Pagach and Warr (2010) and Bertinetti et al. 
(2013) conducted research on ERM effect on the financial performance of both financial and non-financial companies, 
while Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011), and McShane et al. (2011) explored ERM influence on the value of insurance 
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companies.2 The results of these studies are mixed in terms of ERM effect. Gordon et al. (2009), Hoyt and Liebenberg 
(2011) and Bertinetti et al. (2013) found positive effect of ERM implementation to the company’s market value 
measured by Tobin’s Q, while Pagach and Warr (2010) and McShane et al. (2011) found no evidence that ERM affects 
performance and market value.  
 
Regarding the determinants of ERM implementation, Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003), Beasley et al. (2005), Hoyt and 
Liebenberg (2011) and Pagach and Warr (2011) found that larger companies are more inclined to implement ERM. 
Several previous empirical studies (e.g., Nance et al., 1993; Dolde, 1995; Mian, 1996; Géczy et al., 1997; Allayannis 
and Weston, 2001) have found that firms with more assets are more likely to hedge. These studies contend that the 
positive correlation between size and hedging can be attributed to significant economies of scale in information and 
transaction costs of hedging. The same explanation can be offered in the case of ERM level of development, as ERM  
is an expensive process, therefore it pays off for companies that can exploit benefits of this integrated risk management 
system. It can be claimed that larger companies have larger exposures to different types of corporate risks, and that 
these risks are, to a certain extent, mutually correlated, so the benefits of managing risks in an integrated way are 
expected to be larger. Beasley et al. (2005) revealed that the stage of ERM implementation is positively related to the 
presence of a Chief Risk Officer (CRO), board independence, CEO and CFO evident support for ERM, the presence 
of a Big Four auditor, as well as companies in the banking, education and insurance industry. Liebenberg and Hoyt 
(2003) and Pagach and Warr (2011) find that financial leverage is positively associated with ERM implementation, 
but Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) find, using a broader set of indicators, that ERM has a negative relation to leverage. 
Because of the inconsistency of the results, the effect of leverage as a determinant of ERM should be further employed. 
Pagach and Warr (2011) also find that firms that are more volatile, and have greater institutional ownership are more 
likely to adopt ERM. In addition, when the CEO has incentives to take risk, the firm is also more likely to hire a CRO. 
3. Corporate risk management rationales in Croatian companies  
3.1. Methodology and data collection 
Empirical research was conducted on the listed Croatian non-financial companies. We focus our research on a 
population of 149 Croatian companies listed on the Zagreb Stock Exchange. Financial firms were excluded from the 
population. We believe that financial and non-financial companies should not be taken together in one sample as most 
of financial companies are also market makers for risk management instruments; hence their motivation and strategies 
in managing risks may be different in comparison to non-financial firms. Additionally, financial performance cannot 
be explored for both financial and non-financial firms by applying the identical set of measures we propose in this 
study. We believe that, by analysing only non-financial companies, results on ERM effect are more reliable. Managers 
of 61 companies answered to the questionnaire creating a response rate of 41 per cent, what is considered as 
satisfactory for statistical generalisation. The response rate of the 1998 Wharton survey of derivate usage, as reported 
in Bodnar et al. (1998) was 21 per cent. Therefore, obtained research results can be generalized to the whole 
population. However, it is important to mention that the inability to compare the survey results to the data of non-
responding companies should be treated as a limitation of this research.  
 
Data were collected from two sources: from annual reports and notes to the financial statements and through the 
survey. Survey questionnaire was mailed to the firm’s chief risk officer (CRO) or, more often, to the financial director, 
controller or chief executive officer (CEO). Survey data were analysed by using multivariate analysis. Ordinal logistic 
regression was estimated as it is a form of multiple logistic regression used when the dependent variable is ordinal 
and the independents are of any type. Besides the fact that the dependent variable in this research is ordinal, logistic 
regression has been chosen because it enables the researcher to overcome many of the restrictive assumptions of OLS 
regression. E.g. unlike OLS regression, logistic regression does not assume linearity of relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent, does not require normally distributed variables, does not assume 
 
 
2 Bertinetti, Cavezzali, Gardenal (2013) and Pagach and Warr (2010) are published only in the form of working papers.  
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homoscedasticity, normally distributed error terms are not assumed, does not require that the independents be interval 
or unbounded, and in general has less stringent requirements.  
3.2. Research Hypothesis 
Based on the arguments that arise from the presented literature survey, several hypotheses have been proposed in 
this paper. We argue that following companies’ characteristics – size, financial distress, agency costs and asymmetric 
information problem, investment opportunities, risk substitutes, managerial utility maximization and geographic 
orientation - may be relevant for a decision to implement Enterprise Risk Management.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Larger firms are more likely to hedge due to larger exposures to risks and economies of scale related 
to costs of ERM implementation. Hypothesis is supported by findings of Nance et al. (1993), Dolde (1995), Mian 
(1996), Geczy et al. (1997), Haushalter (2000), Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003), Beasley et al. (2005), Hoyt and 
Liebenberg (2011) and Pagach and Warr (2011). 
 
Hypothesis 2: Benefits of risk management are greater the more leveraged is the company due to the increased risk 
of a bankruptcy. Hypothesis is supported by findings of Myers (1984), Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), Campbell 
and Kracaw (1987), Bessembinder (1991), Dobson and Soenen (1993), Dolde (1995), Shapiro and Titman (1998), 
Mian (1996), Haushalter (2000), Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) and Pagach and Warr (2011). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Benefits of risk management are greater the bigger is the asymmetric information problem. 
Hypothesis is supported by findings of Mayers and Smith (1982) MacMinn and Han (1990), Bessembinder (1991), 
Dobson and Soenen (1993), Minton and Schrand (1999), Haushalter et al. (2002).  
 
Hypothesis 4: Benefits of risk management are greater the more growth options are in the firm’s investment 
opportunity set due to the costly external financing. Hypothesis is supported by findings of Froot et al. (1993), Geczy 
et al. (1997), Gay and Nam (1998), Minton and Schrand (1999), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Haushalter et al. (2002). 
 
Hypothesis 5: Development of risk management system is lower the more liquid the firm’s assets are, and the lower 
the leverage. Hypothesis is supported by findings of Froot et al. (1993), Nance et al. (1993), Pagach and Warr (2010), 
Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011). 
 
Hypothesis 6: Managers have limited ability to diversify their own personal wealth position associated with the 
stock holdings and the capitalization of their career earnings, therefore they have strong incentives to manage 
corporate risks. Hypothesis is supported by findings of Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), Tufano (1996).  
 
Hypothesis 7: Companies that are oriented to the international market are exposed to more risks, hence should be 
motivated to develop efficient risk management system. Hypothesis is supported by findings of Beasley et al. (2005). 
 
3.3. Research variables 
A dependent variable has been designed in the form of an ordinal measure of an ERM index that can take the value 
from 0 to 14, depending on the number of ERM characteristics listed below that are present within the company.   
x Is there a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) in your company, responsible for risk management? 
x Is there a special department/division in your company dedicated to risk management?  
x Does your company have a written statement of the firm’s risk appetite? 
x Are there official risk management policy and procedures in your company? 
x Do you apply COSO Integrated Framework for ERM in your company? 
x Do you apply ISO 31000 risk management standard in your company? 
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x Is risk managed with an integrated analysis and management of all identified corporate risks (e.g. financial, 
strategic, operational, compliance and reporting risks)? 
x Do you determine correlations and portfolio risks effects of combined risks? 
x Do you determine quantitative impacts risks may have on key performance indicators? 
x Do you organize workshops in your company where managers discuss exposures to different types of risks and 
risk management strategies (so-called Risk management workshops)? 
x Does your company create a risk map indicating position of risks the company is exposed to, considering 
probability of occurrence and significance of identified risk to the business activity? 
x Do you have a risk response plan for all significant events? 
x Do you submit formal report on risk and risk management to the management board at least annually? 
x Do you monitor key risk indicators aimed at emerging risks (not past performance)? 
 
By conducting a thorough ERM literature review, we recognised these characteristic as integral components of a 
mature ERM systems. The more of them characterises the risk management system in one company, ERM system is 
more developed. We used a complex ERM measure that enabled us to assess the level of ERM development in 
analysed companies. Other ERM studies (Eckles et al. (2014), Bertinetti et al. (2013); Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) 
and Pagach and Warr (2010) used a dummy variable, where ERM use is measured as 1 if the company implemented 
ERM and 0 otherwise. This measure does not take into account the level of ERM development, it just takes into 
account the fact that ERM exist or it does not exist.  
 
We measure company size with natural logarithm of total assets to correct for the effect of different magnitudes of 
variables and to reduce the effect of skewness in the distribution. We predict positive relation between ERM level of 
development and size of the company due to the economies of scale exploitation. To examine the hypothesis regarding 
the reduction of the financial distress cost, the firm’s leverage have been employed. Leverage was used as a proxy for 
the impact of fixed claims on the decision to hedge. Numerous previous studies have used total debt to the book value 
of assets (Tufano, 1996; Nance et. al., 1993; Mian, 1996; Geczy et al., 1997; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001) as a measure 
for company indebtedness. The percentage of firm’s stocks owned by institutional investors was a proxy for the 
asymmetric information and agency problem. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), Tufano (1996) and Geczy et. al. (1997) 
have predicted that a greater share of institutional investors’ ownership is positively related to the availability of 
information, and thus negatively related to the probability of hedging as it is proven that firms with greater 
informational asymmetry benefit greatly from risk management activity. The coefficient on this variable was predicted 
to be negative. Investment (growth) opportunities were measured as the ratio of investment expenditures to the book 
value of assets (Haushalter, 2000; Froot et al., 1993); DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995; Geczy et al., 1997; Smith and Stulz, 
1985). The coefficient on this variable was predicted to be positive. Risk management substitutes were measured as 
cash and marketable securities to the value of current liabilities, while manager’s utility was proxied by manager’s 
tenure or duration of his career spent in the company (DeMarzo et al., 1995). Geographic orientation was measured 
by the binary variable coded “1” of the company operates on the international market and “0” if it is oriented only on 
the domestic market (Beasley et al., 2005).  
4. Research Results 
By using methods of descriptive statistics, we analysed the value of ERM Index in Croatian companies, which 
indicate the level of ERM development in Croatian companies. Graph 1 shows the structure of ERM Index according 
to the value of the Index. Even 38 per cent of analysed companies have no elements of ERM system, from which 22 
per cent do not manage corporate risks at all.  
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Fig. 1. Value of ERM Index in Croatian companies 
 
We categorised companies into three groups according to the value of the Index. Companies with the value from 0 
to 4 were in the category “ERM is not developed”, from 5 to 9 “ERM is moderately developed, while these with the 
value from 10 to 14 are in the group “ERM is highly developed”. Structure of companies are presented in the graph 2 
where it is clearly shown that even 77 per cent of analysed companies have underdeveloped ERM system or corporate 
risk management in general. This argument is confirmed with the result that only 2 per cent (one analysed company) 
have the value of the Index 10 or higher.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Level of ERM development in Croatian companies 
 
Regarding the types of risk managed, graph 3 shows that financial type of risks like currency risk, interest rate risk, 
credit risk, liquidity risk, are taken care of in more than 50 per cent of analysed companies. The same situation is with 
operational risks. Concerning result is related to the negligence of strategic risks such as customer loss risks, which is 
the core risk for every profit organization, risks related to product innovation, reputational risk, legal/regulatory risks 
and political risks. One must ask how is it possible that the business operates successfully if managers do not analyze, 
measure and manage risks that can negatively affect strategic plans and strategic goals. We believe results presented 
in the graph 3 confirm the finding that ERM system is not developed in Croatian listed companies. If ERM exist, all 
corporate risks would be equally important and the total risk exposure would be a relevant measure for risk 
management decision making.   
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Fig. 3. Types of risk managed by Croatian companies (in%) 
 
Furthermore, ordinal logistic regression was estimated to distinguish among the possible explanations for the level 
of ERM development in Croatian companies. Logistic model has tested whether the value of ERM index is a function 
of the seven factors - the size, financial distress costs, agency costs, growth options, managerial utility, risk 
management substitutes and geographic orientation.  
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The multivariate regression model presented in Table 1 has revealed that the level of ERM development is only 
related to the company’s size and investment opportunities. Several previous empirical studies (e.g., Nance et al., 
1993; Dolde, 1995; Mian, 1996; Géczy et al., 1997; Allayannis and Weston, 2001) have found that firms with more 
assets are more likely to hedge. These studies contend that the positive correlation between size and hedging can be 
attributed to significant economies of scale in information and transaction costs of hedging. The same explanation can 
be offered in the case of ERM level of development, as ERM  is an expensive process, therefore it pays off for 
companies that can exploit benefits of this integrated risk management system. It can be claimed that larger companies 
have larger exposures to different types of corporate risks, and that these risks are, to a certain extent, mutually 
correlated, so the benefits of managing risks in an integrated way are expected to be larger.  
 
The investment expenditures to assets ratio, which controls for company’s investment (growth) opportunities, tests 
our prediction that companies with more developed ERM (i.e. higher value of ERM index) are more likely to have 
larger investment opportunities. The main hypothesis is that, if access to external financing (debt and/or equity) is 
costly, firms with investment projects requiring funding will hedge their cash flows to avoid a shortfall in their funds, 
which could precipitate a costly visit to the capital markets. The results of our logistic model marginally support this 
prediction (p = 0,052) and show a positive relation between the value of ERM index and investment expenditures to 
assets ratio.  
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Table 1. Results of multivariate regression analysis 
    Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
Threshold [ERMcharacter = 0] 14,118 3,767 14,049 1 0 
[ERMcharacter = 1] 14,902 3,814 15,268 1 0 
[ERMcharacter = 2] 15,085 3,825 15,55 1 0 
[ERMcharacter = 3] 15,743 3,869 16,555 1 0 
[ERMcharacter = 4] 16,409 3,914 17,577 1 0 
[ERMcharacter = 6] 17,134 3,963 18,696 1 0 
[ERMcharacter = 7] 17,518 3,988 19,296 1 0 
[ERMcharacter = 8] 18,012 4,02 20,073 1 0 
[ERMcharacter = 9] 19,484 4,14 22,149 1 0 
Location Size1 0,645 0,164 15,485 1 0 
LEV2 0,209 1,087 0,037 1 0,848 
GRWT02 0,471 0,243 3,76 1 0,052 
LIQ2 -0,062 0,051 1,463 1 0,226 
Orientation 0,958 0,65 2,174 1 0,14 
OwnINSTINV -0,016 0,011 2,053 1 0,152 
EMPLYQ43 0,043 0,025 2,961 1 0,085 
 
Table 2. Model Fitting Information  
Model -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 221,987       
Final 198,28 23,707 7 0,001 
 
Table 3. Goodness-of-Fit 
  Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 477,418 506 0,815 
Deviance 198,28 506 1 
 
Table 4. Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell 0,336 
Nagelkerke 0,343 
McFadden 0,107 
 
 
We also employed alternative measures of firm‘s characteristics to check robustness of our results. We used 
following measures in our regression model: 
x Size was measured as natural logarithm of the firm’s total sales; 
x Leverage was measured as the book value of the long-term debt to the book value of equity; 
x Growth opportunities was measured as investment expenditures to the book value of total assets; 
x Managerial utility was measured as the percentage of the firm’s outstanding shares held by officers and directors; 
x Hedge substitutes was measured by current assets to the value of current liabilities; 
Geographic orientation was measured as the percentage of the firm’s outstanding shares held by international 
investors. 
 
Results are substantively similar: only size was significant, while growth opportunities were not significant in the 
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model (tables with robustness checks are available on request).  
5. Conclusion 
Research results have revealed low levels of ERM development in listed Croatian companies. 38 per cent of 
analysed companies have no elements of ERM system, from which 22 per cent do not manage corporate risks at all. 
Even 77 per cent of analysed companies have underdeveloped ERM system or corporate risk management in general. 
This argument is confirmed with the result that one analysed company (out of 61) have highly developed ERM with 
the value of ERM Index 10 or higher.  The focus of managers is skewed on financial and operative risk management, 
while strategic risks have been neglected, what opens the question how is it possible that the business operates 
successfully if managers do not analyze, measure and manage risks that can negatively affect strategic plans and 
strategic goals. 
 
Regression analysis has indicated somewhat unexpected but important conclusion. The explored risk management 
rationales have weak predictive power in explaining corporate risk management decisions in Croatian companies. 
Multivariate regression conducted for Croatian companies shows that the level or risk management system 
development is dependent only on the size of the company (robust) and value of the growth options (not robust), what 
support the scale economies argument that larger firms have more developed risk management system due to the high 
expenses of its implementation and due to larger risk exposures, and that firms with investment opportunities requiring 
funding manage risk exposure of their cash flows to avoid a shortfall in internal funds. 
 
Contribution of our study stems from the creation of ERM Index, which could be tested on different markets. We 
also tested risk management theories on the emerging market and concluded that risk management system 
development in Croatian companies is primarily driven by other influential factors then those suggested by the risk 
management literature and explored in this research, which will be explored in our future research.  
 
References 
Allayannis G., Ofek E., 2001. Exchange Rate Exposure, Hedging, and the User of Foreign Currency Derivatives. Journal of International Money 
and Finance 20(2), 273-296. 
Allayannis G., Weston J., 2001. The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives and Firm Market Value. The Review of Financial Studies 14(1), 243-
276. 
Bank for International Settlement (BIS) 2008. Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management. Basel. 
Bartram, SM., 2000. Corporate risk management as a lever for shareholder value creation, Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 9(5), 
279-324. 
Beasley MS., Clune R., Hermanson DR., 2005. Enterprise Risk Management: An Empirical Analysis of Factors Associated with the Extent of 
Implementation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 24, 521-531. 
Bertinetti GS., Cavezzali E., Gardenal G., 2013. The effect of the enterprise risk management implementation on the firm value of European 
companies. Working paper 10/2013, Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia. Available at: 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/vnm/wpdman/46.html. 
Bessembinder H., 1991. Forward Contracts and Firm Value: Investment Incentive and Contracting Effects. The Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 26(4), 519-532. 
Bodnar G.M., Hayt G.S., Marston R.C., 1998. 1998 Wharton Survey of Derivatives Usage by US Non-Financial Firms, Financial Management 
27(4), 70-91. 
Bromiley P., McShane MK., Nair A., Rustambekov E., 2014. Enterprise Risk Management: Review, Critique, and Research Directions. Long 
Range Planning (available online)  
Campbell TS, Kracaw WA., 1987. Optimal Managerial Incentive Contracts and the Value of Corporate Insurance. The Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 22 (3), 315-328. 
Culp, C., 1994. Structured debt and Corporate Risk Management. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 7(3), 73-84. 
Cumming CM., Hirtle BJ., 2001. The Challenges of Risk Management in Diversified Financial Companies. FRBNY Economic Policy Review 7, 
1-17. 
DeMarzo PM., Duffie D., 1995. Corporate Incentives for Hedging and Hedge Accounting. Review of Financial Studies 8(3), 743-771. 
Dobson J., Soenen L., 1993. Three Agency-Cost Reasons for Hedging Foreign Exchange Risk. Managerial Finance 19(6), 35-44. 
Dolde W., 1995. Hedging, leverage and primitive risk. Journal of Financial Engineering 4(2), 187-216. 
779 Danijela Miloš Sprčić et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  30 ( 2015 )  768 – 779 
Eckles DL., Hoyt RE., Miller SM., 2014. The Impact of Enterprise Risk Management on the Marginal Cost of Reducing Risk: Evidence from the 
Insurance Industry. Journal of Banking and Finance 43, 247-261.  
European Commission. 2010. Green Paper: Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and Remmuneration Policies. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com2010_284_en.pdf  
Froot KA., Scharfstein DS., Stein JC., 1993. Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies. Journal of Finance 
48(5), 1629-1658. 
Gay GD., Nam J., 1998. The underinvestment problem and corporate derivatives use. Financial Management 27(4), 53-69. 
Geczy C., Minton BA., Schrand C., 1997. Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives. The Journal of Finance 52(4), 1323-1354. 
Gordon LA., Loeb MP., Tseng CY., 2009. Enterprise Risk Management and Firm Performance: A Contingency Perspective. Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy 28, 301-327. 
Graham JR., Rogers DA., 1999. Is Corporate Hedging Consistent with Value Maximization? An Empirical Analysis. Duke University Working 
Paper, Place: Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=170348  
Haushalter GD., 2000. Financing Policy, Basis Risk, and Corporate Hedging: Evidence from Oil and Gas Producers. The Journal of Finance 55(1), 
107-152. 
Haushalter GD., Heron RA., Lie E., 2002. Price Uncertainty and Corporate Value. Journal of Corporate Finance: Contracting, Governance and 
Organization 8(3), 271-286. 
Hoshi T., Kashyap A., Scharfstein D., 1991. Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 106(1), 33-60. 
Hoyt RE., Liebenberg AP., 2011. The Value of Enterprise Risk Management. Journal of Risk and Insurance 78(4), 795-822. 
Jensen M., Meckling W., 1976. Theory of the Firm Managerial Behaviour, Agency Cost and Capital Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 
3(4), 305-360. 
Lam J., 2001. The CRO Is Here to Stay. Risk Management 48, 16-20. 
Lam J., 2003. Enterprise Risk Management: From Incentives to Controls. John Wiley & Sons: Hoboken, New Jersey. 
Liebenberg AP., Hoyt RE., 2003. The Determinants of Enterprise Risk Management: Evidence from the Appointment of Chief Risk Officers. Risk 
Management and Insurance Review 6(1), 37-52. 
Lundquist SA., 2014. An Exploratory Study of Enterprise Risk Management: Pillars of ERM. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 29(3), 
393-429.  
MacMinn RD., Han LM., 1990. Limited Liability, Corporate Value, and the Demand for Liability Insurance. The Journal of Risk and Insurance 
57(4), 581-607. 
Mayers D., Smith Jr. CW., 1982. On the Corporate Demand for Insurance. The Journal of Business 55(2), 281-296. 
McShane MK., Nair A., Rustambekov E., 2011. Does Enterprise Risk Management Increase Firm Value, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and 
Finance 26(4), 641-658. 
Meulbroek LK., 2002. Integrated Risk Management for the Firm: A Senior Manager’s Guide. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 14: 56-70. 
Mian S., 1996. Evidence on Corporate Hedging Policy. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31(3), 419-439. 
Miloš Sprčić D., Šević Ž., 2012. Determinants of Hedging Decisions in Croatian and Slovenian large non-financial companies. Research in 
International Business and Finance 26(1), 1-25. 
Minton BA., Schrand C., 1999. The impact of cash flow volatility on discretionary investment and the cost of debt and equity financing. Journal of 
Financial Economics 54(3), 423-460. 
Modigliani M., and Miller M., 1958. The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and Theory of Investment. The American Economic Review 48(3), 
261-297. 
Myers CS., 1984. The Capital Structure Puzzle. Journal of Finance 39(3), 575-592. 
Myers S., Majluf N., 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of 
Financial Economics 13(2), 187-221. 
Nance DR., Smith., CW, Smithson CW., 1993. On the determinants of corporate hedging. Journal of Finance 48(1), 267-284. 
Nocco BW., Stulz RM., 2006. Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and Practice. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 18(4), 8–20. 
OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance. Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs. 2010. Corporate Governance and the Financial 
Crisis. Conclusions and emerging good practices to enhance implementation of the Principles. OECD: Paris. 
OECD. June 2009. Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages. OECD: Paris. 
Pagach D., Warr R., 2010. The Effects of Enterprise Risk Management on Firm Performance. Working paper 27695, Jenkins Graduate School of 
Management, North Carolina State University  
Pagach D., Warr R., 2011. The Characteristics of Firms that Hire Chief Risk Officers. The Journal of Risk and Insurance. 78(1), 185-211.  
Shapiro AC., Titman S., 1998. An Integrated Approach to Corporate Risk Management. 251-265. in: Stern, JM, Chew Jr., DH. (eds.) The revolution 
in corporate finance. Blackwell Business: Malden, Mass. and Oxford.  
Smith CW., Stulz RM., 1985. The Determinants of Firms Hedging Policies. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 20(4), 391-405. 
Stulz R., 1984. Optimal Hedging Policies. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 19(2), 127-140. 
Tufano P., 1996 Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry, Journal of Finance 
51(4), 1097-1137. 
 
 
